Robust visualization and discrimination of nanoparticles by interferometric imaging

Single-molecule and single-nanoparticle biosensors are a growing frontier in diagnostics. Digital biosensors are those which enumerate all specifically immobilized biomolecules or biological nanoparticles, and thereby achieve limits of detection usually beyond the reach of ensemble measurements. Here we review modern optical techniques for single nanoparticle detection and describe the single-particle interferometric reflectance imaging sensor (SP-IRIS). We present challenges associated with reliably detecting faint nanoparticles with SP-IRIS, and describe image acquisition processes and software modifications to address them. Specifically, we describe a image acquisition processing method for the discrimination and accurate counting of nanoparticles that greatly reduces both the number of false positives and false negatives. These engineering improvements are critical steps in the translation of SP-IRIS towards applications in medical diagnostics.R01 AI096159 - NIAID NIH HHSFirst author draf

Does Crime Pay? Cartel Penalties and Profits

This article seeks to answer a fundamental antitrust question: does crime pay? Do the current overall levels of U.S. cartel sanctions adequately discourage firms from engaging in illegal collusion? Seven years ago our research showed that the unfortunate answer was clearly that, yes, criminal collusion usually is profitable! The expected costs (in terms of criminal fines and prison time, civil damages, etc.) was significantly less than expected gains to the price fixers. Sadly, the most recent data re-affirm this conclusion. The great majority of companies participating in illegal cartels make a profit even after they pay all the penalties. The current level of sanctions is only 9 to 21 percent of optimality, so it follows that current overall sanction levels should be quintupled. To move modestly in this direction, we propose five specific recommendations. Only the first and possibly the last would require new legislation. First, legislation should add prejudgment interest to both private treble damage actions and criminal fines. Second, the U.S. Sentencing Commission should double its current presumption that cartels raise prices by an average of 10 percent. (Hundreds of independent estimates show that median cartel overcharges since 1990 have averaged 23 percent, and the mean overcharge has been more than 35 percent for domestic cartels, and 56 percent for international cartels.) Third, the budget of the Antitrust Division should be increased significantly. Fourth, as Judge Douglas Ginsburg and others have recommended, the DOJ should insist, in its plea bargaining negotiations, that corporate defendants agree not to hire or re-hire anyone who has been convicted of price fixing for a specified (and long) period. Finally, the United States should implement a whistleblower reward or bounty system for individuals who turn in cartels. Together, these proposals would more nearly deter price fixing optimally. They would save victimized consumers and businesses from paying billions of dollars per year in cartel overcharges

The Size of Cartel Overcharges: Implications for U.S. and EC Fining Policies

The purpose of this article is to examine whether the current cartel fine levels of the European Union (EU) and the United States are at the optimal levels. We collected and analyzed the available information concerning the size of the overcharges caused by hard-core pricing fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation agreements. Data sets of United States cartels were assembled and examined. These cartels overcharged an average of 18% to 37%, depending upon the data set and methodology employed in the analysis and whether mean or median figures are used. Separate data sets for European cartels also were analyzed, which show overcharges in the 28% to 54% range. We similarly examined cartels that had effects solely within a single European country (which showed significantly lower overcharges, averaging in the 16% to 48% range)

Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays

This article is the first to analyze whether cartel sanctions are optimal. The conventional wisdom is that the current level of sanctions is adequate or excessive. The article demonstrates, however, that the combined level of current United States cartel sanctions is only 9% to 21% as large as it should be to protect potential victims of cartelization optimally. Consequently, the average level of United States anti-cartel sanctions should be approximately quintupled. The United States imposes a diverse arsenal of sanctions against collusion: criminal fines and restitution payments for the firms involved and prison, house arrest and fines for the corporate officials involved. Both direct and indirect victims can sue for mandatory treble damages and attorney\u27s fees. This multiplicity of sanctions has helped give rise to the strongly held - but until now never seriously examined - conventional wisdom in the antitrust field that these sanctions are not just adequate to deter collusion, but that they are excessive. We analyze this issue using the standard optimal deterrence approach. This model is predicated upon the belief that corporations and individuals contemplating illegal collusion will be deterred only if expected rewards are less than expected costs, adjusted by the probability the illegal activity will be detected and sanctioned. To undertake this analysis we first calculate the expected rewards from cartelization using a new and unique database containing 75 cartel cases. We survey the literature to ascertain the probability cartels are detected and the probability detected cartels are sanctioned. We calculate the size of the sanctions involved for each case in our sample. These include corporate fines, individual fines, payouts in private damage actions, and the equivalent value (or disvalue) of imprisonment or house arrest for the individuals convicted. Our analysis shows that, overall, United States\u27 cartel sanctions are only 9% to 21% as large as they should be to protect potential victims of cartelization optimally. This means that, despite the existing sanctions, collusion remains a rational business strategy. Cartelization is a crime that on average pays. In fact, it pays very well. Accordingly, our concluding section suggests specific ways cartel sanctions should be increased to become more nearly optimal. This should save consumers many billions of dollars each year

The Size of Cartel Overcharges: Implications for U.S. and EC Fining Policies

The purpose of this article is to examine whether the current cartel fine levels of the European Union (EU) and the United States are at the optimal levels. We collected and analyzed the available information concerning the size of the overcharges caused by hard-core pricing fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation agreements. Data sets of United States cartels were assembled and examined. These cartels overcharged an average of 18% to 37%, depending upon the data set and methodology employed in the analysis and whether mean or median figures are used. Separate data sets for European cartels also were analyzed, which show overcharges in the 28% to 54% range. We similarly examined cartels that had effects solely within a single European country (which showed significantly lower overcharges, averaging in the 16% to 48% range)

Not Treble Damages: Cartel Recoveries Are Mostly Less Than Single Damages

Antitrust law provides treble damages for victims of antitrust violations, but the vast majority of private cases settle. The average or median size of these settlements relative to the overcharges involved has, until now, been only the subject of anecdotes or speculation. To ascertain what we term Recovery Ratios, we assembled a sample consisting of every completed private U.S. cartel case discovered from 1990 to mid-2014 for which we could find the necessary information. For each of these 71 cases we collected, we assembled neutral scholarly estimates of affected commerce and overcharges. We compared these to the damages secured in the private cases filed against these cartels. Our main findings are that the victims of only 14 of the 71 cartels (20%) recovered their initial damages (or more) in settlement. Only seven (10%) received more than double damages. The rest—the victims in 57 cases—received less than their initial damages. In four cases the victims received less than 1% of damages and in 12 they received less than 10%. Overall the median average settlement was 37% of single damages. The unweighted mean settlement (a figure that gives equal weights to the cartels that operated in large markets and to those that operated in small markets) was 66%. However, because plaintiffs tend to be rewarded relatively poorly in the largest cases, the weighted mean (a figure that weights settlements according to cartels\u27 sales) was only 19%. The mean and median average Recovery Ratios are higher (81.2% and 52.4%, respectively)for the 36 cases that followed criminal convictions of U.S. antitrust law. The conclusion of this Essay briefly discusses some of the implications of these findings

How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications for Optimal Cartel Fines

This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing Guidelines are set at the appropriate levels to deter cartels optimally The authors analyze two data sets to determine how high on average cartels raise prices. The first consists of every published scholarly economic study of the effects of cartels on prices in individual cases. The second consists of every final verdict in a US. antitrust case in which a neutral finder of fact reported collusive overcharges. They report average overcharges of 49% and 31% for the two data sets, and median overcharges of 25% and 22%. They also report separate results for domestic cartels, international cartels, more recent cartels, and bid-rigging The authors conclude that the current Sentencing Commission presumption that cartels overcharge on average by 10% is much too low. If this finding is correct, the principles of optimal deterrence imply that the current levels of cartel penalties should be increased significantly. Our survey identified about 200 serious social-science studies of cartels which contained 674 observations of average overcharges. Our primary finding is that the median cartel overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods has been 25%; 17-19% for domestic cartels, and 30-33% for international cartels. Thus, in general, international cartels have been about 75% more effective in raising prices than domestic cartels. Since the United States has had, historically, by far the toughest system of anti-cartel sanctions, this could imply that these sanctions have been having significant effects. In our social-science sample, 79% of the overcharges were higher than the 10% presumption contained in the US Sentencing Guidelines; 60% were above 20%. Perhaps surprisingly, bid rigging was no more injurious than other forms of collusion. If anything, our data suggests that bid rigging might be about one-fifth less injurious. These results suggest that the USSC should amend its Guidelines, which currently treat bid rigging more harshly than other forms of collusion. The results of the survey of final verdicts in decided U.S. collusion cases, only three of which were international cartels, show an average median overcharge of 21.6% and an average mean overcharge of 30.0%. Thus, the 25 decisions produce average overcharges that are quite comparable to the results of the much larger set of economic estimates. All but five of the reported decisions found that the cartel had raised prices by more than the USSC\u27s 10% benchmark. For these reasons, if the U.S. Sentencing Commission decides to re-examine whether 10% is the right overcharge presumption, it should consider raising the presumption to 15% for domestic cartels and 25% for international cartels. This is a conservative and modest proposal in light of this article\u27s demonstration that cartels typically generate at least two or three times the harms presumed by the current Sentencing Guidelines

Price-Fixing: Hefty Penalties on Big-Biz Cartels Will Provide Level Playing Field to Small Businesses

Cartels are illegal in India, as they are almost everywhere. They are subject to heavy fines. Why, then, do businesses frequently try to fix prices? Because doing so usually is profitable. On average cartels raise prices by more than 20%, and probably face less than a 25% chance of being caught and convicted. Based upon a sample of 75 international cartels, the authors calculate that the expected profits from price fixing almost always exceed the penalties. No wonder businesses often try to fix prices

Price-Fixing: Hefty Penalties on Big-Biz Cartels Will Provide Level Playing Field to Small Businesses

Cartels are illegal in India, as they are almost everywhere. They are subject to heavy fines. Why, then, do businesses frequently try to fix prices? Because doing so usually is profitable. On average cartels raise prices by more than 20%, and probably face less than a 25% chance of being caught and convicted. Based upon a sample of 75 international cartels, the authors calculate that the expected profits from price fixing almost always exceed the penalties. No wonder businesses often try to fix prices

Not Treble Damages: Cartel Recoveries Are Mostly Less Than Single Damages

Antitrust law provides treble damages for victims of antitrust violations, but the vast majority of private cases settle. The average or median size of these settlements relative to the overcharges involved has, until now, been only the subject of anecdotes or speculation. To ascertain what we term Recovery Ratios, we assembled a sample consisting of every completed private U.S. cartel case discovered from 1990 to mid-2014 for which we could find the necessary information. For each of these 71 cases we collected, we assembled neutral scholarly estimates of affected commerce and overcharges. We compared these to the damages secured in the private cases filed against these cartels. Our main findings are that the victims of only 14 of the 71 cartels (20%) recovered their initial damages (or more) in settlement. Only seven (10%) received more than double damages. The rest—the victims in 57 cases—received less than their initial damages. In four cases the victims received less than 1% of damages and in 12 they received less than 10%. Overall the median average settlement was 37% of single damages. The unweighted mean settlement (a figure that gives equal weights to the cartels that operated in large markets and to those that operated in small markets) was 66%. However, because plaintiffs tend to be rewarded relatively poorly in the largest cases, the weighted mean (a figure that weights settlements according to cartels\u27 sales) was only 19%. The mean and median average Recovery Ratios are higher (81.2% and 52.4%, respectively)for the 36 cases that followed criminal convictions of U.S. antitrust law. The conclusion of this Essay briefly discusses some of the implications of these findings